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Abstract. A  number of modern theologians have concluded that the rise of 
natural science makes it necessary to give up the idea that God acts in particular 
ways to affect the course of events in the world. I reply to this claim, taking up 
the challenge to explain what might be meant by a ‘special’ act of God. There 
are several ways to conceive of such acts, including the possibility that God 
might determine what is left determinable in the structures of nature, e.g., at 
the quantum level. I address objections to this view, and consider metaphysical 
puzzles that it presents.
How can we conceive of special, or particular, divine action in the world 
described by the contemporary natural sciences?
Anxiety over this question has played an important role in forming 
(and, arguably, deforming) a great deal of modern theological reflection, 
often providing the rationale for fundamental revisions of what had 
been core teachings in mainstream belief and practice. Theists in the 
Abrahamic traditions have classically affirmed that God acts not only 
at the foundation of the world as its creative ground, but also within its 
ongoing history as the providential guarantor that the divine purposes 
will be achieved. If the findings or methods of the sciences are somehow 
incompatible with the idea that God acts in particular ways to affect the 
course of events in the world, then religious thought and practice in the 
theistic traditions will have to change.
These dynamics are vividly illustrated in the struggles of the biblical 
theology movement. In the 1950s thinkers like G. Ernest Wright and 
Bernard Anderson called for a  renewed recognition that the God of 
the Bible is an  agent who acts at particular times and places to call, 
promise, judge, renew, and redeem (Wright 1952; Anderson 1957). 
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The proclamation of this Heilsgeschichte, they contended, is the primary 
content of the faith. In a now famous critique, Langdon Gilkey argued 
that the biblical theologians were caught in an awkward dilemma (Gilkey 
1961). They insisted that narratives of divine action, such as the story of 
the Exodus from Egypt, constitute the core of Biblical revelation. But 
as informed participants in the scientific age they were committed to 
understanding events as occurring within a lawful continuum of natural 
causes, rather than as reflecting dramatic interventions by supernatural 
agents. So if God did not turn the Nile to blood or part the waters of the 
red sea, then what did God do to bring about the liberation of the Jewish 
people from captivity? In the absence of any account of God’s role in the 
events of the Exodus, these theologians were left in the uncomfortable 
position of proclaiming that God is made known through ‘mighty acts 
in history’, yet being unable to say what God has done. Gilkey concluded 
that,
... in the shift of cosmology from ancient to modern, fundamental 
theological concepts have so changed their meaning as almost to have 
lost all reference ... It is no good repeating the abstract verbs ‘to act’ and 
‘to speak’, if we have no intelligible referents with which to replace the 
vanished wonders and voices ... Unless we have some conception of how 
God acts in ordinary events, we can hardly know what our analogical 
words means when we say: ‘He acts uniquely in this event’ or ’this event 
is a special act of God’. (Gilkey 1961: 204)
In this paper I want to take up Gilkey’s challenge, clarifying what might 
be meant by ‘special’ divine action, and sorting out the possible relations 
of such acts to ‘ordinary events’. Gilkey decided that the ascendancy of 
modern (i.e., scientific) cosmology makes it necessary to give up the idea 
that God acts within the world’s history to affect the course of events. 
I  will argue that he is mistaken about this, and contend instead that 
a strong conception of special divine action remains a viable option in 
contemporary theology.1
CREATION
If we are to think through God’s relation to ordinary events, we need 
to begin with the doctrine of creation. The idea of creation has been 
elaborated in a number of different ways in the history of theology, but 
1 This discussion draws upon material from Tracy (2012), and Tracy (2010).
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I will focus here on a view (or family of views) that came to occupy the 
mainstream of the tradition: the doctrine of creation out of nothing, 
creatio ex nihilo. God’s creative act brings about the existence of all finite 
reality, and apart from this act nothing but God would exist. Creation 
is not a one-time event that generates a world which thereafter persists 
on its own. Created things exist from moment to moment in absolute 
dependence upon God; God empowers them to be, and if God were to 
cease doing so, they would return to nothingness. For creatures, therefore, 
relationship to God is essential; to be is to be in relation to God, and in 
this relation is found not only the creature’s ground but also its highest 
good. God, on the other hand, does not require the existence of creatures 
in order to be God; God creates the world out of love because it is good 
for the world to be. Creation is a gift of the divine generosity.
It follows that God’s relation to creatures as their creator is 
fundamentally different from any causal relation that holds among 
created things. Created things stand in causal relations by virtue of 
bringing about changes in other things. This is true even when the action 
brings something new into existence (the creation of a work of art) or 
causes something to cease to exist (as in causing the death of a  living 
organism). God’s creative act, by contrast, does not merely cause a change 
in the creature, but rather produces the creature itself. Apart from this act, 
there is ‘no-thing’ to change. God’s creative activity, therefore, radically 
transcends the causal powers of creatures.
This understanding of creation provides the foundation for answering 
Gilkey’s question about God’s relation to events in the ordinary course 
of nature. God as creator acts in every moment of the world’s history as 
it source and ground. There can be no event untouched by the divine 
agency, and it is seriously misleading to contrast ‘extraordinary’ events in 
which God acts and ‘ordinary’ ones in which God does not. God acts in 
every event, and the question about special divine action is whether and 
on what grounds some of these events might be singled out as distinctive 
or unique.
A further refinement is needed here, however. It might be thought that 
this strong understanding of God’s universal creative action displaces 
created causes altogether, and makes God the only productive power at 
work in the world. If God is the immediate cause of the existence of 
each entity along with all its properties, this may appear to leave no role 
for the operation of created causes. Consider the paradigmatic causal 
event of billiard balls interacting on a pool table. We might suppose that 
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the doctrine of creation entails that God not only immediately sustains 
the existence of each entity involved in this event, but also causes them 
to possess their specific properties from moment to moment. So God 
causes there to be a cue ball with a particular trajectory and velocity, and 
an instant later God causes there to be a motionless cue ball and a target 
ball with a  related trajectory and velocity. On this account, it appears 
that all the causal work is done by God, and created entities are merely 
‘occasions’ for God’s continuous activity of actualizing each new state of 
the universe. As long as this divine activity forms consistent patterns, the 
world will display a causal structure in the regularist sense, without any 
role for creaturely causal power or efficacy.
Roughly this position was embraced by thinkers who came to be 
known as ‘occasionalists’, but it has consistently been rejected by most 
Christian theologians. Thomas Aquinas described the view of Muslim 
occasionalists in this way: ‘Some have understood God to work in every 
agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that 
God alone is the immediate cause of everything wrought: for instance, 
that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth.’ (Aquinas 
1265-1272: I, 105,5) Aquinas energetically resisted this account, and 
insisted that ‘God works in things in such a manner that things have also 
their proper operation’. No doubt God could operate as the occasionalists 
suggest, and directly cause all of the events that constitute the world’s 
history. But Aquinas contended that God’s creative power is more fully 
expressed by granting causal powers to created things, so that in their 
interactions they affect and are affected by each other. As Aquinas put it, 
‘there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence, . . . not because of 
any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; 
so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.’ (Aquinas 
1265-1272: I, 22,3)
God’s generosity in creation, therefore, includes empowering 
creatures to bring about changes in the properties of other creatures 
in an  ordered structure of causal relationships. Only God can cause 
being, but both God and creatures, if God so wills, cause change. This 
establishes the familiar scheme of primary and secondary causation, in 
which God acts on two levels. God acts directly without intermediaries 
in every event as the ground of the creature’s existence. God also acts 
by means of the ordinary processes of nature to produce a vast range of 
particular effects, and these effects can properly be described an indirect 
divine acts. This pattern of action attribution is familiar to us in daily 
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life. We often do one thing (vote for our favoured candidate) by doing 
another (marking a ballot). These chains of indirect action can be quite 
extensive, though there are some important limits on action attribution 
to human agents, since we frequently fail to accomplish what we intend, 
and produce instead various outcomes we do not want. In the case of 
indirect divine action, however, these limitations do not apply. God could 
so arrange the network of created causes that all and only the effects 
intended by God come to pass. This would be the case, for example, 
in a  perfectly deterministic natural order. By establishing a  complete 
set of deterministic causal laws and setting the initial conditions, God 
could specify every event in the world’s history, each of which would 
be an  indirect divine act no matter how remote it might be from the 
initial state of the universe. The emergence of a new species and the fall 
of an  individual sparrow would each be God’s intentional act, though 
they are brought about through an  inconceivably complex chain of 
intermediate events as means.
This story about divine action becomes more complex, of course, 
if we move away from a  simple deterministic picture, and include 
underdetermined chance or libertarian free action in our account. I will 
say more about this in a moment, but it is worth observing that even in 
indeterministic worlds, God’s creative choice will establish and delimit 
the range of possible developments and their relative probabilities. This 
guarantees that God has profound providential control over the world’s 
history.
SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION
Given this account of God’s action in ordinary events, how might we 
respond to Gilkey’s challenge to explain what we mean by a  ‘special’ 
divine act? There are at least three ways in which we might mark out 
some events as divine acts in a distinctive sense.
First, we can begin where Gilkey ends, with the familiar shift in liberal 
theology to a  strictly epistemic interpretation of special divine action. 
On this account, the significance of the event consists solely in its role in 
prompting a new insight or revealing an important truth. What makes 
this event special is its effect on us; it need not entail any distinctive form 
of divine action in the world. Suppose, for example, that the escape from 
captivity in Egypt involved only the ordinary processes of nature without 
any supernatural divine intervention. This experience may nonetheless 
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play a crucial role for the Hebrew people in awakening a vivid recognition 
of God’s liberating purposes and forming their understanding of their 
place in those purposes; the exodus is a subjectively special moment in 
Jewish religious self-understanding. As Gilkey pointed out, the Biblical 
theologians hesitated to make any stronger claim than this about special 
divine action, and this reluctance fatally undermined their proposals.
Second, an  event might be special by virtue playing a  distinctive 
role in the world’s developing history. This can be the case even if this 
development results from ordinary processes at work in nature and 
human history. We have just seen that events built into the plan of 
creation from the outset can be attributed to God as indirect divine 
acts. It could happen that some of these events might make an especially 
important contribution to advancing God’s purposes, e.g., as a turning 
point or a culmination. This will be a fact about the event in its relation 
to the overall course of the world’s history, and not just an observation 
about our beliefs regarding it; indeed, we might often fail to recognize the 
actual importance of such events. On this view, the improbable escape 
of the Hebrew people from subjugation in Egypt not only reveals God’s 
purposes, but also advances them in a special way; the exodus would be 
a functionally special indirect divine action.
Third, an  event might be marked out as special because God acts 
directly within the world’s history to bring it about. More precisely, God 
might act to ensure the occurrence of this event even though created 
causes alone, given the world’s actual history to date, would not be 
sufficient to produce it. This would be an objectively special divine action, 
distinguished from other events by the way God brings it about  – its 
causal history will include, along with all its natural antecedents, a specific 
divine input. This takes a  step beyond the idea of functionally special 
divine action, because in this case God produces an effect in the world 
not by writing this outcome into the program of history at the outset, 
but rather by acting within the world once its history is underway. If this 
is the mode of God’s action in the Exodus, then in addition to acting 
indirectly through the order of created causes, God affects the course of 
events directly to ensure that the Jewish people escape from Egypt.
SCIENTIFIC VETOES
All three of these understandings of special divine action can be affirmed 
simultaneously of a  single event. But it is useful to distinguish them 
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because they make claims of varying strength, and can be separately 
asserted or denied. It is, of course, the third way of conceiving of 
special divine action that has been so problematic in modern theology. 
There are multiple reasons for this, including historical-critical and 
interpretive considerations, but an  overriding concern has been the 
alleged incompatibility of such claims with scientific understandings 
of the world. I have elsewhere called this the ‘scientific veto argument’ 
(Tracy 2012: 59-61), and variants of it have become a  commonplace 
in contemporary theology. If we attempt to formulate this argument, 
however, its weaknesses quickly become apparent.
Consider, for example, a particularly adventurous version presented by 
Gordon Kaufman. He contends that the sciences have generated a ‘modern 
conception of nature and history as a web of interrelated events that must 
be understood as a self-contained whole’, and he concludes that ‘in such 
a world acts of God (in the traditional sense) are not merely improbable 
or difficult to believe: they are literally inconceivable’ (Kaufman 1972: 
132, 135). In making his case, Kaufman observes that that the sciences 
seek to explain events in terms of lawful causal relations to other events 
within the system of nature, and they exclude appeals to causes or agents 
that are not part of that structure. Suppose that we accept this claim 
about the methodological naturalism of the sciences. Objectively special 
divine action would be ruled out of scientific explanations (contra some 
forms of intelligent design hypothesis), but this does not entail an across 
the board rejection of this idea; it remains available for use in non-
scientific contexts. Kaufman must defend a stronger claim: namely, that 
the sciences understand the web of natural events as ‘self-contained’ in 
the sense of being immune to outside influences. This would entail that 
there can be no objectively special divine action in the world described 
by the sciences. But why should we accept this view? Kaufman seems 
to think that this is a  necessary presupposition of scientific inquiry. 
His argument here slides unselfconsciously from methodological to 
metaphysical naturalism. Although the sciences may be committed in 
principle to seeking explanations of a particular type (i.e., ‘naturalistic’ 
ones, whatever that might turn out to mean), they cannot themselves 
authorize the conclusion that there always are such explanations to be 
given. The program of scientific inquiry can be extended indefinitely, 
but there is no guarantee, from within that enterprise, that it will always 
be successful.
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Kaufman’s argument, then, overstates the case against objective 
divine action in the world. But thinkers like Kaufman and Gilkey are 
correct in recognizing that the natural sciences have profoundly affected 
the epistemic context within which theology now operates. We bring to 
our experience a  strikingly different set of expectations than did, say, 
Gregory the Great when he wrote the Life of St. Benedict. Gregory tells 
us, for example, about a  monastic graveyard that would not hold the 
body of a disobedient monk; the sacred ground spontaneously exhumed 
the corpse each time it was reburied until finally Benedict forgave the 
monk his misdeed (an unauthorized visit to his parent’s home, during 
which he died outside the monastery). (Gregory the Great c. 590, 1895: 
Ch. 24) Many of us, I would venture to say, are not inclined to accept 
this story at face value as an  accurate report of an  historical episode. 
But, contra Kaufman, the problem is not that we share a scientific world 
view that rules out the possibility of such events. Rather the difficulty is 
epistemic; the story is at odds with our prevailing sense of how things 
go in the world, and so would require especially strong backing in order 
to become credible to us. This, of course, is the core idea developed by 
Hume’s epistemic argument against miracles. But we can resist Hume’s 
sweeping dismissal of all miracle claims while still acknowledging that 
such claims face special evidential burdens in our epistemic context, 
a  context that includes background beliefs shaped by the modern 
sciences. The veto argument, I suggest, reflects an overreaction to this 
intellectual situation.
The background beliefs shaped by our scientific culture are, to be 
sure, a mixed bag. One problematic belief that has played a significant 
role in discussions of objective divine action has been the assumption 
that causal explanations in the sciences must not only be naturalistic 
but also deterministic, and that causal closure in a  complete system 
of deterministic relations constitutes the scientific norm. Once again, 
we need to make a  distinction between a  (putative) methodological 
commitment to seeking explanations that provide causally sufficient 
conditions, and the metaphysical doctrine of universal determinism. 
Modern theologians have often overlooked this distinction, treating 
universal determinism as a concomitant of scientific inquiry. If this is 
our picture of the natural order, then there are just two ways in which 
God can shape the direction of the world’s development. On the one 
hand, God’s creative act can determine every event in cosmic history 
by specifying the laws of nature and a set of initial conditions. On the 
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other hand, God can intervene in the deterministic series to break the 
chain of natural causes and redirect the course of events. If intervention 
is rejected, then God’s providential guidance of the world’s history must, 
without remainder, be built into the act of creation. Deism responded 
in just this way to the triumphant determinism of eighteenth century 
mechanics, and the result was that the God who acts in history was 
replaced by Laplace’s demon.
Given the failure of the scientific veto argument, the idea of divine 
intervention should not be ruled out as an  option in contemporary 
theology. Indeed, if we affirm that God is the creator ex nihilo of the 
whole structure of finite causes, it would be odd to deny that God could 
act directly in the world. But given the epistemic challenges facing claims 
about intervention, the cautiousness of many modern theologians on 
this point is understandable.
DIVINE ACTION IN AN INDETERMINISTIC WORLD
Perhaps there is a way beyond this simple and unsatisfying juxtaposition 
of deism and interventionism. The conceptual options for thinking 
about direct divine action change in intriguing ways if we consider 
the possibility that God has created a  world whose history does not 
constitute a  rigidly complete causal system, but rather includes open 
alternatives for the future. In such a world, there will be at least some 
developments that are not precisely determined by their antecedents; in 
just these circumstances, any of some range of different outcomes will be 
possible. These events are not uncaused, but they are underdetermined, 
that is, they have necessary but not sufficient causal conditions in the 
world’s prior history. If the natural order includes processes of this sort, 
then God could select among these alternative possibilities without 
disrupting any deterministic causal sequence. This would be an objective 
divine action that affects the world’s unfolding history, but it would not 
be an  intervention, if by this term we mean an  action that interrupts 
an otherwise complete series of finite causes and effects.2
This represents a third way of thinking about special divine action. But 
this alternative will be available only if (1) it is plausible to understand the 
causal structures of our world as under-determined in some respects, and 
(2) these under-determined events can make the right sort of difference 
2 On difficulties in defining ‘intervention’ see Plantinga (2011: 108-113).
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in the subsequent development of the world’s history. The question about 
whether and how these two conditions might be met has led in recent 
years to a sustained engagement of theology with science, and a variety of 
possibilities have been explored3. One of the most promising has focused 
on indeterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics. Needless to 
say, this carries us well outside the home territory of theology, and the 
discussion must be exploratory and tentative in character. I  want to 
suggest that whether or not this line of thought makes a contribution to 
a theology of divine action, it raises some puzzling wider questions about 
God’s relation to nature in an indeterministic world.
The first thing to be said about quantum mechanics is that the theory 
can be interpreted in a  fascinating variety of different ways, and it is 
a  mistake to present any one of these interpretations as representing 
the findings of quantum theory. This interpretive pluralism reflects 
the challenge of trying to imagine a  world that gives rise to the odd 
behaviour observed in the laboratory and described by the quantum 
formalism. The quantum realm lies at the foundation of our familiar 
world of discrete objects bearing determinate properties, and yet it 
defies description in these terms. Some of the properties of an electron, 
for example, have definite values; this is true of its mass, charge, and 
spin magnitude. But other properties stand in uncertainty relations 
such that if we gain information about one, we lose information about 
another; this is true of the electron’s position and momentum, and its 
spin orientation on more than one axis. In order to describe the state 
of the electron, we must map a  set of probabilities for the value that 
would be obtained for each property if we were to measure it, and 
before a measurement is made these properties remain indeterminate. 
Mutually exclusive outcome states for the position or momentum of the 
electron are conjoined in a ‘superposition’ described by the Schrödinger 
wave equation. This mathematical representation of the quantum object 
undergoes a  continuous (i.e., deterministic) development over time. 
But when the right sort of interaction takes place, the wave function 
‘collapses’ to a specific value for the measured property. It is here that we 
encounter underdetermination in quantum mechanics; the theory, at the 
level of its mathematical formalism, does not explain the selection of one 
of these possible outcomes rather than another.
3 For example, see the collections of essays from a series of conferences on divine 
action and natural science: Russell (1993-2007).
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This peculiar situation has provoked interpretive disagreements right 
from the start. In an extended debate with Nils Bohr, Einstein insisted 
that quantum theory had to be incomplete, that there must be hidden 
variables that would make it possible in principle to provide a sufficient 
reason for the outcomes produced under various measurement 
conditions. The probabilistic character of quantum theory, he thought, 
ought to reflect the limits of our knowledge, and not the way the world 
works. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen generated the famous EPR thought 
experiment to show that if quantum theory is complete, it has various 
counter-intuitive consequences when applied to systems involving two-
particles whose wave equations are entangled (viz., ‘spooky action at 
a distance’) (Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen 1935: 777–780). J. S. Bell (1987) 
later demonstrated that quantum theory and deterministic local hidden 
variable theories of the sort Einstein envisioned produce different 
predictions for the correlation outcomes of EPR-type experiments 
(when the detectors are set at different angles). In the 1970’s it became 
technically possible to conduct such experiments, and the quantum 
predictions were confirmed.
This does not mean that quantum theory cannot be interpreted 
deterministically. But it does mean that a  quantum mechanical deter-
minism will be a very different creature than the familiar macroscopic 
determinism of Laplace. David Bohm’s reconstruction of quantum 
mechanics, for example, manages both to preserve classical particles 
with determinate properties and to provide these particles with complete 
deterministic trajectories. But in order to match the observed quantum 
statistics, he posits a ‘quantum potential’ that sustains instantaneous links 
between spatially distant regions (Bohm 1952: 166-193). When we make 
a measurement on an entangled two particle system, the orientation of 
the measuring device is registered by the pilot wave as a whole, and this 
fixes the state of the other particle even if the two are separated at ‘space-
like’ distances, i.e., distances great enough that no causal influence can 
be communicated within the signalling time permitted by the speed of 
light. This generates a deterministic hidden variable theory, but it does so 
by giving up the causal locality of classical determinism.
Bohm’s interpretation has not been not widely embraced among 
physicists and philosophers of physics, though it certainly remains a live 
option. Many theorists profess a reluctant allegiance to the ‘Copenhagen 
interpretation’, but even this is actually a  diverse family of related 
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views. For my purposes, it is enough to note what is generally shared 
among these approaches. First, they treat quantum theory as complete, 
rather than looking for hidden variables, and they therefore grant that 
properties held in superposition are indeterminate until measurement. 
Second, they accept that the transition from the superposition state 
to a  determinate outcome is underdetermined; when a  measurement 
occurs, the quantum system described by the wave equation undergoes 
a discontinuous collapse.
If quantum mechanics is interpreted this way, then the natural order 
at a deep level may provide a vast array of branching alternative pathways, 
all of which are available within its causal history. The structure of such 
a world weaves together law and chance, regularity and flexibility. But 
the presence of chance in nature is not enough by itself to provide for 
an open future. Chance transitions at the quantum level will need to have 
particular causal consequences over and above establishing the stable 
regularities of the macroscopic world. Unsettled scientific questions arise 
here, particularly with regard to the possible role of quantum events as 
triggers for chaotic amplification. But we know that quantum transitions 
can have specific effects at the macroscopic level  – this happens in 
physics labs when measurements are made on quantum systems – and 
there are good reasons to think that some processes in nature function 
this way. A striking example can be found in evolutionary biology, where 
quantum effects play a role in some kinds of genetic mutation, and the 
results of these changes can then be amplified or extinguished by natural 
selection. (Russell 1998: 191-224)
An indeterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics, therefore, 
holds some promise of opening up fresh options in thinking about 
special divine action in the world. Of course, any theological proposal 
along these lines will be intimately tied to the current state of physical 
theory, and will be vulnerable both to new theoretical developments 
and to changing assessments of the relative plausibility of competing 
interpretations. As we have seen, modern theologians typically have 
fled from this kind of empirical exposure. But if theology is going to be 
relevant to the world in which we actually take ourselves to live, then it 
may need to run such risks, recognizing that this interpretive dialogue 
will be open-ended and that the ideas it generates will be tentative and 
revisable.
It is important not to overstate what is at stake in a proposal of this 
kind. Divine action through quantum (or any other) underdetermination 
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would be just one of the ways God might act in the world, and it will not 
be the most basic. We have already seen that, in the first place, God acts 
directly as creator ex nihilo in every event. Second, God acts indirectly by 
means of created causes as they operate according to natural law. Third, 
God can directly intervene in an  otherwise deterministic secondary 
causal series. Fourth, we now add an additional possible mode of direct 
divine action in the world – namely, that God acts to determine some or 
all of what is left underdetermined by secondary causes.4 These ways of 
conceiving of divine action provide a rich set of resources that we can 
call upon in responding to Gilkey’s challenge to explain what we mean 
by an act of God in history.
THEOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS AND METAPHYSICAL CONUNDRUMS
Let me now turn briefly, first, to theological objections to the idea of non-
interventionist direct divine action at the quantum level, and second, to 
some conceptual puzzles generated by this idea.
A  number of objections are rooted in uneasiness with the idea 
that God would be so pervasively involved in the mundane business 
of moving the world along from one state to the next. This may seem 
excessively hands-on, over-involved, and quotidian – a kind of busywork 
that is beneath the dignity of the creator. It entails that God acts among 
or alongside secondary causes, and this purportedly treats God as one 
power among others, filling in where created causes are insufficient. This 
has the effect of demoting God from the position of transcendent creator 
of the world to being merely a formative power in the world, a cosmic 
demiurge.
These intuitive misgivings can be sharpened into at least two more 
precisely expressed objections. First, the idea that God acts at the 
quantum level might be criticized as a  return to the discredited ‘God 
of the gaps’. Modern theology has not found it a  winning strategy to 
seek out points at which scientific explanations are incomplete, and 
rush forward to insist that this is where God’s hand can be seen at work. 
The problem, of course, is that when these gaps are filled by expanded 
scientific understanding, God is once again pushed out of the world.
4  I hasten to add that these do not exhaust the range of possibilities. I have said 
nothing, for example, about divine action through the free intentional actions of created 
persons. I discuss this topic in Tracy (2010).
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The reply, in brief, is that not all gaps are created equal; that is, they 
do not all arise in the same way. The gaps that give the God of the gaps 
a bad name are merely epistemic; they are a consequence of limitations 
in our current understanding of the way the world works. By contrast, 
the gaps identified by indeterministic interpretations of quantum 
mechanics reflect incompleteness in the causal structures of the world, 
i.e., they are ontological gaps (and therefore also epistemic gaps). The 
existence of these gaps is part of what quantum theory (so interpreted) 
has discovered about the world; they reflect what we currently think 
we know, rather than simply being artefacts of temporary ignorance. 
If our best current physical theory suggests that God has chosen to make 
a world with an objectively gappy structure, then this is an interesting 
fact that theology should take into account.
A second objection elaborates the worry that direct divine action at 
the quantum level (or finally at any level in the structure of nature) fails to 
appreciate appropriately the transcendent character of God’s agency. The 
root problem, the objector claims, is contained in the very idea that God 
makes use of openings in the structures of nature in order to act without 
displacing secondary causes. This allegedly misunderstands the nature of 
divine agency, which as the creative ground of all finite things does not 
need to find a way into the world to act. Every activity of created things 
necessarily is an activity of the God who causes them to be. So there can 
be no trade-off, no juxtaposition, of God acting or creatures acting. The 
notion that there can be competition between divine and created agency, 
and that God must find ‘room’ in the world to act, represents God as one 
agent among others all of which operate on the same level.
This objection begins with a  sound theological premise about 
creation, but the conclusion is a  non sequitur. I  noted earlier that the 
concept of creation out of nothing entails a  fundamental distinction 
between God’s act of causing being and creatures’ acts of causing change. 
Nothing in the idea of direct divine action at the quantum level (or 
anywhere else in the structure of nature) denies this distinction. Rather, 
the idea is that the God who acts always and everywhere to give being to 
creatures, might also freely choose to act among them in their history. 
As Aquinas notes, God ‘is not subject to the order of secondary causes, 
but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, ... Therefore God can 
do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for 
instance, by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or 
by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend’ 
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(Aquinas 1265-1272, 1945: I, 105, 6). If God chooses to act in this 
way, then there will be a trade-off between divine and created agency. 
In these instances, God rather than the creature produces the effect. But 
in acknowledging this possibility, we are not claiming that in general 
divine and created agencies are locked in a zero-sum game. Nor does 
direct divine action (whether interventionist or non-interventionist) 
among secondary causes reduce God to the status of a secondary cause. 
As sovereign creator ex nihilo, God may act directly in the world without 
being diminished; it would be strange to say otherwise in a religion with 
divine incarnation at its centre.
These particular theological objections, then, are misconceived. 
But significant conceptual puzzles certainly do arise in considering 
divine action at the quantum level. I want to suggest that some of these 
puzzles present difficulties not just for attempts to construct a  non-
interventionist account of divine action, but for theology generally in 
conceiving of God’s relation to the created order. If God has chosen to 
make a  world that includes ontological chance, then we must grapple 
with the question about God’s relation to these underdetermined events. 
This question arises even if one has no interest in the kind of proposal 
I have sketched here, and it leads to some fascinating and fundamental 
metaphysical issues. There appear to be only two possibilities: events that 
are underdetermined by secondary causes must either be determined by 
God or by nothing at all.
Each of these alternatives brings with it further intriguing questions, 
though there is space here only to introduce them briefly. Consider the 
second possibility, namely, that God leaves quantum transitions ‘up to 
chance’. How is this possible for the creator of the universe ex nihilo? 
Human beings can resort to chance (say, by rolling dice or flipping a coin) 
because we are unable to predict the outcome of the events in question; 
even if we understand the relevant causal laws, our knowledge of the 
initial conditions is insufficiently detailed to make possible an accurate 
calculation. But chance obviously cannot work this way for the Creator 
who brings about both the causal structures and the initial conditions 
under which they operate. Perhaps God might ordain that a  creature 
shall instantiate any of some set of possible properties. The puzzle here is 
that God must cause there to be an entity or event whose content is not 
fully specified either by God in the act of giving it being nor by secondary 
causes. Peter van Inwagen (1988) has considered this possibility, and 
has suggested that God might leave even the initial state of the universe 
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undetermined. Perhaps God’s creative decree takes the form: ‘Let one 
of X or Y or Z  come to be.’ One of these possible worlds would then 
spring into existence without sufficient reason for doing so. This account 
of creation would no doubt disappoint defenders of the cosmological 
argument, since appeal to a self-existent creator of the world would not 
after all provide a sufficient reason for the existence of this universe.
Alternatively, we can hold that God determines the outcome of 
naturally underdetermined transitions in quantum systems. This 
preserves the principle of sufficient reason. But if God directly brings 
about the outcome of every quantum transition, then these phenomena 
are an  immediate expression of God’s activity, and so are the objects, 
properties, and relations built up on this base. Our familiar world 
consists of a vast aggregation of events actualizing God’s choices between 
alternative possibilities. At this point, we may wonder whether we are 
witnessing the second coming of occasionalism.5
Recall that the traditional theological response to occasionalism 
contended that God’s creative act endows creatures with causal powers 
of their own, capacities to cause change in other creatures and, in turn, to 
be changed by them. Historically, of course, the theory of causal powers 
developed as an analysis of the relations of macroscopic objects taken 
as discrete and determinate particular things. Causal powers are (or are 
linked to) intrinsic properties of particulars; to possess these properties 
is to be disposed under appropriate stimulus conditions to display 
characteristic behaviours and to produce characteristic effects. As we’ve 
seen, however, the quantum theory disrupts this metaphysical picture. 
An electron, like a macroscopic object, has a determinate mass that when 
observed is found at one location in space. Unlike a macroscopic object, 
however, the electron before we observe it does not have a determinate 
location, but somehow combines a mutually incompatible set of positions 
in a region of space. It hardly needs to be said that this is not the sort of 
entity envisioned by traditional accounts of created causes.
The first move in response to this strange new picture is to revise our 
account of causal powers so that it incorporates the stochastic properties 
of quantum entities, and allows for non-necessitating, probabilistic 
causality. The created bearer of causal powers would then be understood 
as an  evolving structure of potentiality, an  entity defined not only by 
various intrinsic determinate properties, but also by a set of well-defined 
5 I draw here upon Tracy (2013).
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probabilistic propensities. The causal powers of this entity include its 
capacity to generate with precise likelihoods this range of outcome states 
under the requisite measurement conditions.
So far, so good – but further puzzles immediately arise. Under many 
conditions ‘quantum entities’ cannot be individuated as separate bearers 
of stochastic properties. Consider a  two electron system. According 
to the Pauli exclusion principle these electrons must be described by 
a single anti-symmetric wavefuction. Their joint state is not simply the 
sum of objective probabilities possessed by each electron considered 
individually; rather, they can only be described in relation to each other. 
In EPR-type experiments, physicists make separate measurements on 
two particles. But these particles cannot be regarded as localized bearers 
of causal powers. When a  measurement is made on one electron, it 
collapses the wave function for its anti-correlated counterpart. Rather 
than there being a  transmission of causal influence between discrete 
individuals, these particles appear to constitute a  relational system, 
a  whole that somehow maintains instantaneous correlations of its 
separated components. Current physical theory suggests that this is 
a  ubiquitous feature of our world, and so the challenge is to develop 
an intelligible analysis of this situation in terms of causal powers.
It is tempting to sidestep these puzzles by regarding quantum theory 
strictly as a  useful conceptual scheme for organizing experimental 
results and directing inquiry, but not as disclosing new classes of entities 
with causal powers. Talk about particles and their properties would have 
value not as a description of the quantum stuff we encounter in the lab 
(and elsewhere of course), but as a model that can incorporate current 
observational data, predict results, shape ongoing inquiry, and so on. 
What matters scientifically is that the object language of the theory 
(its description of the inhabitants of the ‘particle zoo’) is empirically 
adequate, i.e., able to account for current observations. But we would 
remain agnostic about whether this language correctly describes real 
items in the world, i.e., about whether it is literally true.
This metaphysical modesty is appealing. But if we adopt this 
cautious anti-realism, then we no longer have bearers of causal powers 
at the quantum level. Instead, we have patterns of events organized 
according to probabilistic laws that support complex counter-factual 
conditionals  – causality in a  strictly regularist sense. If we assert that 
all of these events are directly produced by God, then God is the only 
productive cause, and we are no longer in a  position to reply to the 
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occasionalist by contending that God produces these effects by means of 
the operation of secondary causes.
Occasionalism has its advantages; it eliminates problems about how 
God can act in the order of nature without disrupting or displacing 
secondary causes, since there are no secondary causes. God is the cause 
of all change as well as of all finite beings, and natural laws simply 
identify recurring patterns in this divine action. Christian theologians 
have usually thought that this represents a loss of value in the world. In 
an occasionalist world, as Aquinas said, creatures do not ‘have also their 
[own] proper operation’. They lack, we might say, a structure of active 
being that is their own, and in this respect the occasionalist’s God stops 
short of positing the creature as a  genuine other, differentiated from 
God’s own activity.6
Quantum mechanics, then, may open the door to a  non-interven-
tionist account of objective divine action. But when we step through that 
door, we enter an  unfamiliar world that leaves us facing fundamental 
metaphysical puzzles about God’s relation to the world. In this context, 
it will not be enough simply to repeat classical claims about divine 
action through secondary causes; we need to grapple with some difficult 
underlying questions about how to conceive of such causes.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, Bernhard W. 1957. Understanding the Old Testament (Englewood 
Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall)
Aquinas, Thomas. 1265-1272. Summa Theologica, Part I, Anthony C. Pegis (ed.), 
Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1945)
Bell, John S. 1987. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics (New 
York: Cambridge University Press)
Bohm, David. 1952. ‘A Suggested Interpretation of Quantum Theory in Terms 
of Hidden Variables, I & II’, Physical Review, 85: 166-193
Burrell, David B., Carlo Cogliati, Janet Soskice & William R. Stoeger (eds). 2010. 
Creation and the God of Abraham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Einstein, Albert, Boris Podolsky & Nathan Rosen. 1935. ‘Can Quantum-
Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?’, 
Physical Review, 47: 777-780
Ellis, George, Michael Heller & Tadeusz Pabjan (eds). 2013. The Causal Universe 
(Krakow: Copernicus Center Press)
6 Bas van Fraasen argues that ‘the language of science should be literally construed, 
but its theories need not be true to be good’ (1976: 632).
149SPECIAL DIVINE ACTION AND NATURAL SCIENCE
Gilkey, Langdon. 1961. ‘Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical 
Theology’, The Journal of Religion, 41: 194-205
Gregory the Great. c.590, 1895. Dialogues, Bk. II: The Life of Our Most Holy 
Father St. Benedict. Available at: <http://www.ccel.org/ccel/gregory/life_
rule> [accessed 6 Aug. 2015]
Kaufman, Gordon D. 1972. God the Problem (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press)
Morris, Thomas V. (ed.). 1988. Divine and Human Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press)
Plantinga, Alvin. 2011. Where the Conflict Really Lies (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press)
Russell, Robert John (ed.). 1993-2007. Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 
6 vols. (Vatican City: Vatican Observatory, and Berkeley, CA: Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences)
Russell, Robert John. 1998. ‘Special Providence and Genetic Mutation’, in Robert 
John Russell, William R. Stoeger & Francisco Jose Ayala (eds), Evolutionary 
and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Vatican City: 
Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences), 
pp. 191-223
Russell, Robert John, William R. Stoeger & Francisco Jose Ayala (eds). 1998. 
Evolutionary and Molecular Biology: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action 
(Vatican City: Vatican Observatory and Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences)
Tracy, Thomas. 2010. ‘God and Creatures Acting: The Idea of Double Agency’, 
in David B. Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, Janet Soskice & William R. Stoeger 
(eds). Creation and the God of Abraham (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 221-237
Tracy, Thomas. 2012. ‘Scientific Vetoes and the Hands-Off God: Can We Say 
that God Acts in History?’, Theology and Science, 10 (1): 55-80
Tracy, Thomas. 2013. ‘God and the Causal Structures of Nature: Some Puzzles’, 
in George Ellis, Michael Heller & Tadeusz Pabjan (eds), The Causal Universe 
(Krakow: Copernicus Center Press), pp. 269-290
Van Fraasen, Bas C. 1976. ‘To Save the Phenomena’, Journal of Philosophy, 73 
(18): 623-632
Van Inwagen, Peter. 1988. ‘The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God’, 
in Thomas V. Morris (ed.), Divine and Human Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press), pp. 211-235
Wright, George Ernest. 1959. God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday & Co.)
